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This study examines the relationship between national debt levels and income inequality in an
economy. With no a priori specification on the direction of causality, the role of either variable in
influencing the other is analysed. The study makes use of panel data from 34 countries of
different geographical regions and development status , over the period running from 1980 to
20 IO. Analysis of data is done by means of country fixed effects panel regressions. Including
control variables such as government expenditure, real GDP growth and inflation, the findings
indicate a significant positive influence of income inequality on debt levels, with the exception of
European and Developed countries. Similarly, the levels of national debt are found to positively
and significantly impact the degree of heterogeneity in the distribution of incomes. These results,
therefore, bring to question the appropriateness of using excessive government expenditure to
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National debt has been one of the core subjects of economic discourse and literature. Over the last
century, a rich political economy literature has developed examining the determinants and effects
of national debt. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its Public Sector Statistics Guide sets
out the definition of gross debt of the general government as "all liabilities that are debt
instruments . A debt instrument is defined as a financial claim that requires payments of interest
and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date(s) in the future" (International Monetary
Fund, 20 II , p. 3).
Amongst the five types/levels of debt instruments, debt securities and loans are the most relevant
in reporting debt statistics of a country. Moreover, only the debt and spending attributable to three
levels of government: the budgetary central government, composed of judiciary, legislature and
executive, social security funds , extra-budgetary units, such as state agencies, and local/state
governments, is relevant in the computation of government debt and government spending
(Dipplesman, Dziobek, & Mangas, 20 12).
A further distinction can be made between domestic debt and external debt. Amongst the thre e
common definitions to distinguish between the two , the officially adopted one is, dom estic debt is
that for which the residents of the economy issuing the debt are the creditors, whereas external
debt is held by non-resident creditors (Panizza, 2008).
While national debt has been one of the central themes in economic literature, in recent years, it
has attracted even more attention to itself due to the notoriousness with which fiscal deficits hav e
persisted in many countries leading to accumulation of huge amounts of debt (Larch, 2012).
Greiner writes, ' Public debt has been a major problem for industrialized countries in the world
since the second world war' (Greiner, 20 I0, p. 205). Developing countries, especially in Afr ica,
have also had their own fair share of run-ins with the menace of high national debt. The rise of
debt levels in many developed economies was further amplified by the 2007/2008 global
financial crisis.
With joint public debt at levels not seen since the end of World War II, many countries are
moving to tame their persistent fiscal deficits (Batini, Call egari , & Melina, 20 12). The Euro-zone
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and other countries like Japan have opted for the now infamous auster ity measures. Other
countries, like the U.S. , that are not yet facing market pressures and waning investor and public
confidence seem to be postponing fiscal consolidation and instead going for monetary
policy/tools to stimulate economic growth. While these measures may playa significant role in
curbing rising debt levels , one may argue that they are rather short -term and do not address the
root causes of the problem. Redistributive and welfare spending, which have become a significant
portion of govemment budgets, may hint at a possible root cause for the increase in public debt ,
income inequality.
Whi le national debt has received its fair share of attention, the other subject of this study, income
distribution, has been ' out in the cold' as relates to the study of main stream or modern
neoclassical economics (Larch, 20 12). Larch notes that 'Only recently after decades of increasing
inequality of income in developed countries ... the public eye and the economic profession are
grad ually rediscovering the personal distribution of income as a relevant economic issue' (p. 54).
And indeed income inequality has been increasing ove r the last three decades (International
Monetary Fund , 20 14). The gap between the rich and the poor is at its highest level in most
OECD countries in the last thirty years (OECD, 2014).
Income inequality refers to the extent of disproportionate distribution of aggregate income across
consumption units in the economy (Schutz, 1951). It is an indicator of how material resources are
distributed across society (OECD, 20 II). However, it differs from other forms of economic
inequality; inequality of wealth, inequality of lifetime and inequality of opportunity, in that it is
concerned with household or individual incomes whereas the other three capture distributio n of
wealth, lifetime incomes and social mobility respectively (International Monetary Fund , 20 14).
The consumption unit is usually taken as a household and income is taken as monetary
benefits/compensation received from employment, investment, trade or in kind benefits (The
Equality Trust, 2012).
Income inequality is measured in a number of ways , most commonly using the Gini coeffic ient,
based on the Lorenz curve mechanism. The Gini coefficient is essentia lly a rat io that yields a zero
value in perfect income equality and' I ' in perfect income inequal ity. The higher the value of the
ratio, the more unequal income distribution is. The Gini coefficient can also be measured using
different criteria for the recognition of income. These are such as total income, market income,








such as 90/1 0 and 20:20, and the Palma ratio (The Equality Trust, 2012) as well as the Robin
Hood Index (The Equality Trust, 20 II) .
A number of theories and models have come up to explain why fiscal deficits would arise . These
are such as tax smoothing, geographically distributed interests, distribution conflicts with social
groups and/or political parties and "models of intergenerational conflict (Alesina & Perotti , 1995) .
However, not many of these theories or models focus explicitly on income distribution as a
possible propagator of fiscal deficits.
Furthermore, 'autonomous ' events such as wars and conflict, business/economic cycles and large
infrastructural projects have traditionally been known to lead to deficit spending (Alesina &
Perotti , 1995). However, in light of recent developments, another item that may be added to this
least is welfare spending. This has grown to be a substantial proportion of government spending
in many countries. The average public welfare expenditure as a percentage of GOP for countries
in the OECD is 22.5 percent and in the European Union (EU) the figure is 25.4 percent (OECD,
2009). Where no explicit welfare programs are in place , welfare and redistributive spending take
place through the provision of free public services, subsidization of essential goods and the
adoption of tax systems in favour of the lower income earners.
One may of course object that a government can achieve its redistributive exp enditure goals and
attain a balanced budget. However, the propositions made in this paper are that: first , the more
unequally distributed incomes are , the higher the demand for redistributive spending and the more
difficult it is to balance the budget. Secondly, the more unequal society is, the greater the delays
in making the fiscal adjustments necessary in correcting the dismal and unsustainable fiscal
situation. And thirdly, the more unequal society is, the higher the proportion of the cost of fiscal
consolidation to be borne by the less well off, hence the greater the resistance to what would
amount to austerity measures by the government. These three propositions strongly suggest that
there is some link between income distribution and national debt.
A reversed direction of causality between income inequality and national debt has also been
suggested by some authors (You &Dutt (1996); Salti (20 II)). The idea behind such a
relationship is that the more the national debt, specifically, domestic share of national debt, the
higher the interest payments paid out to the exclusive group of wealthy individuals owning the
debt instruments. This debt servicing is facilitated by taxes collected from the working class.
This paper seeks to investigate the relationship between national debt and income inequality.








significance of the impact of income inequality on national debt and that of national debt on
income inequality using panel regression and granger causality tests.
1.2 Problem statement
For many economists it was a wonder that debt levels continued to rise even in times of peace
(Alesina & Perotti , 1995). While a number of theories have been advanced to explain the
perpetual fiscal deficits countries have been running (Alesina & Perotti , 1995) , very few have
looked into distributional conflicts, due to the heterogeneity of distribution of income, as a
possible culprit. With regards to empirical investigations into the same, Larch (20 I2) comes short
of adm itting that none had been undertaken at the time .
With the apparent correlation in the trends of national debt and income inequality, there also
exists the possibility of reversed direction of causality, that is, higher national debt leading to
higher income inequality. However, such a relationship too has hardly been investigated,
theoretically nor empirically. Salti (20 I0) refers to the literature on the distributional effects of
public debt as scant while You and Dutt (1996) state that many analysts saw the rise in national
debt levels and income inequality as unrelated.
There is therefore a need to further explore the relationship between national debt and income
inequality, within an economy, and to establish if either has any impact on the other and hence
also establish the direction of causality between the two economic variables .
1.3 Resea rch Objectives
i. To analyse the role of income inequality in determining the level of national debt.
II. To analyse the role of the domestic share of national debt in determining the level of
income inequality.
1.4 Research Quest ions
i. What role does income inequality play in determining the level ·of national debt in an
economy?





1.5 Sign ificance of the Research
This study is of benefit to fiscal policy makers and planners, world economic agencies and
advisers as well "as economic analysts and "researchers in the areas of fiscal planning and income
distribution. The findings of the study will enable fiscal planners and policy makers as well as
other participants involved in seeking a solution to the persistent fiscal deficits and rising levels
of debt to consider possible root causes of this problem and hence better evaluate possible long-
term solutions. The findings will also enable fiscal planners to weigh wisely different alternatives
of deficit financing as regards to their impact on income inequality.
This study will further benefit the society(s) at large due to the direct effects both public debt and
income inequality have on individuals' lives . National debt has been shown to have an effect on
economic growth, wage levels and disposable incomes for both the current and future
generations. Effective management of national debt will therefore go a long way in improving the








This section of the paper reviews existing literature on the subject matter of the study. Looking
first atthe validity of the premise that national debt needs to be properly managed; the section
moves on to look at theoretical literature on the relationship between national debt and income
inequality, after whi ch a review of empirical analyses previously carried out is done.
2.1 Theor etical Literatur e Review
2.1. 1 A need fo r p ro per deb t managem ent
In the 1940s and ' 50s , the controversy that surrounded national debt mainly pertained to whether
or not the real cost of national debt could be shifted to future generations. The predominant view
then was "National debt is no burden to the economy and the real cost of government
expenditure, no matter how financed , cannot be shifted to future generations." (Modigliani , 196 I,
p.730).
However, this view has long been abandoned. Bowen, Davis & Kopf, (1960) show that both the
debt asset and the liability can be passed on to the next generation, by sale , bequests or death,
depending on whether it is debt or asset, if the government does not choose to retire the debt
within the time of the current generation. Furthermore, it is the generation existing at the time the
government chooses to retire the debt that will bea r the cost of this mode of financing. (Bowen,
Davis, & Kopf, 1960) .
The proponents of the idea that national debt is no burden to the economy also recognized a
potential objection to that idea . If debt has no burden to the economy and its real cost cannot be
shifted to future generations, "why not forego altogether the painful activity of levying taxes?"
(Modigliani , 196 I , p. 732). To counter this objection it is argued that the purpose of taxes is not
to make current members of the community pay for the government use of goods and services,
hence a balanced budget, but instead to prevent the great social evil of inflation.
In response to this argument, Modigliani (1961) shows that with the use of monetary policy there
will not be one, "but a whole schedule of values of T (tax), which are consistent with the
maintenance of full employment and price stability, each value of T accompanied by an
appropriate monetary policy." (p . 736). He further shows that if one starts with a COITect







increasing consumption, monetary policy will have to be tightened in order to maintain price
stability. In fact , increased government expenditure without increased taxes, will lead to a
corresponding decrease in capital formation (I) . From the Keynesian framework, to maintain full
employment without inflation, we must have dG + de + dl = O. Therefore, if government
expenditure is raised without an increase in taxes,
dG = dD = -dl
where D is debt. Consumption which responds only to taxes will remain unchanged leading to
only one variable being affected, capital formation . Hence the increase in government
expenditure puts no burden on the CUITent members of the community but affects future
generations through the stock of capital inherited by them . Moreover, the deficit-financed
expenditure leaves an overall burden on the economy in form of a reduced flow of income from
the reduced stock of private capital. Taking the interest rate the government borrows at to be an
approximate measure of the marginal productivity of capital, then the reduction in future stream
of capital will be adequately approximated by r ~'(dD) .
Diamond (1965) analyses the effect of government debt not only on the capita l stock of an
economy, but also on the utility of individuals in the context of a neoclassical growth model in
long-run equilibrium. He distinguishes between internal and external debt and makes the
conclusion that "in the long-run, government debt has two effects both arising from the taxes
needed to finance interest payments. The taxes directly reduce available lifetime consumption of
the individual taxpayers. Furthermore, by reducing his disposable income, taxes reduce his saving
and thus the capital stock. Internal debt has an even greater negative effect on capital stock
arising from the substitution of government debt for physical capital in individual portfolios"
(Diamond, 1965, p. I 126).
Barro (1974), however, contends with the conclusions that individual savings decrease, relative to
consumption, as government debt increases. He contradicts the popular theory that an
expansionary fiscal policy, that is, a reduction in taxes backed by simultaneous increase in public
debt, leads to increased aggregate demand. He asserts that , the idea that the private sector
perceives government bonds as net wealth due to increased disposable income is a fallacy. He
instead argues that individuals recognize the future tax obligations due to them and the future
generations necessary for financing the servicing of the debt. Given that the individuals' utility is
dependent not only on their own consumption but also that of their heirs , the current generation
will not increase their consumption but will instead increase their savings to meet the future
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obligations, that is, they will capitalise their future obligations. This therefore means that
government debt is equivalent to taxation and has no effect on private capital accumulations
(Barro, 1974) .
However, Buchanan (1976) questions the plausibility that tax payers fully capitalize their future
tax liabilities arguing that 'perceived net wealth, as relevant for "spending behaviour, increases
with increase in either private or public debt' (p. 340) . Both Buchanan (1976) and Feldstein
(1976) cast doubts on Barro's conclusions given what they consider to be his ' restrictive and
empirically unwarranted assumptions' (Feldstein, 1976, p. 331) . These assumptions are such as,
that the economy has a constant population and no economic growth. By considering the growth
of the economy and the rate of interest on government debt , Feldstein (1976), dispels the
argument that government debt brings about equal aggregate future liabilities. He also shows that
the creation of public debt or social security ' wealth' depresses savings in a growing economy,
thereby reducing the accumulation of private capital leading to a lower capital labour ratio and
hence lower wages for future generations.
To get a more comprehensive picture on the effects of government debt one also needs to look at
the potential yield of the capital expenditure the government finances using the debt. Modigliani
(1961) concludes that ' if the government spends on projects which produce a yield in the future,
then the gross burden will be offset by the gross yield and the net outcome may even be positive. '
(p. 755). Secondly, Modigliani also argues that due to the multiplier effect from the increased
consumption, the gain in income to those present is likely to be appreciably larger than the lost
stock of capital which approximates the present value of the sacrificed income streams. This
translates into a stimulated increase in economic growth in the short run and to a certain extent in
the long run as well.
2.1.2 Effect of pu blic deb t on income distribution
You and Dutt ( 1960) analyse the proposition by some economists that the existence of domestic
debt results in interest payments, being paid to an exclusive small minority of wealthy
individuals, facilitat ed by tax revenues from "the working class thereby skewing income away
from workers. To make this analysis they build a post Keynesian model in which the growth rate
of an economy is constrained by resource aggregate demand instead of resource supplies.
To factor in income distribution into the model , You and Dutt (1996) consider two income classes
within their model , workers and capitalists. They share the total output of the economy, X, where




capital ists and workers, also have different tax rates, T; and T; respectively. You and Dutt (1996)
further assume that only the capitalists have a marginal propensity to save , s. to facilitate the
investments and debt purchases. To actually test the earlier mentioned hypothesis, the regressive
redistributive effect of domestic debt on income, it is assumed that only the capitalists hold debt
assets and hence their income consists of their share of total output plus the real interest payments
they receive, nX + iD/P, where i is the interest rate of domestic debt, D and P is the price level.
Therefore, the inequality ratio, the ratio of disposable income received by the capitalists to that
received by the workers is given by
v=
iD
(1- Tc)(rrX + p)





If we divide both the numerator and denominator by capital stock K, we get
V(6.1f) = (l-Tc) ( JTU + iO)
, (l-Tw)(l-Jr)u
where, 1/ is the productivity of capital , X/ K' referred to in the paper as capacity utilization and IS is
D
the ratio of real public debt to capital stock,-.
PK
The ratio can further be written as:
(1f+iS/u) _ (l-Tc)
v(o,Jr) = q (1-"'-' ,where q = .
'.j (1- Tw )
Therefore, the inequality ratio has three determinants: the relative tax rates , q, the profit share of
output, n; and the ratio of interest income to income from total real output given by ~. Remember
u
is i D/ PK i D/ P .. . .
that, - = -x--/ =-- = ratio of mterest mcome to mcome from total real output. The focus
U K X
is kept on the latter determinant, given that it is the one that brings out explicitly the effect of
domestic debt on income inequality. From the equation showing the inequality rat io, it can be
seen that the higher the interest income to total output ratio, the higher the inequality. The main
determinant of the interest incom e to total output ratio that is considered is the real debt to capital
ratio, 0. This ratio captures a rise in national debt, at least in the relative sense.
From an in depth analysis of the relationship between 0 and the inequality ratio v(0, n) the rate of
capital accumulation g (0, Jr) and the productivity of capital , referred to in the paper as capacity





debt on income distribution depends on the reason for the rise in government debt. Other things
held constant, a rise in debt to capital ratio implies an increase in income inequality. However,
although in many cases they do find that a rise in the debt capital ratio accompanied a worsening
in the distribution of income, this relationship does not always hold. This is because the
proponents of the theory that increased national debt worsens income inequality fail to consider
the expansionary effects of a rise in nat ional debt, even through the multiplier effect.
2.1.3 Effect of income inequali ty on fiscal performance
Larc h (2012) looks into the role of income distribution in determin ing fiscal perfo rmance of a
country. The idea behind the study is that pol itical ' struggles ' between different social groups,
including the ' poor ' and the 'rich ' can delay fiscal adjustments towards ba lanced budgets and
lead to accumulation of debt. The hypothesis is that income inequality can lead to some kind of
'soothing' increases in spending unmatched by revenue increases.
Larch (20 12) distinguishes two groups of mode ls dea ling with income distribution. The first
focuses on the red istribution of pre-tax income via the politica l process. Studies in this area (D ixit
& Londregan (1996); Meltzer & Richard (1981» conclude that the more unequal the distribution
of income, the higher the level of redistributive spending. Furthermore, due to the negative effect
of redistributive spending on economic growth, then 'in a more unequal society with higher
demand for redistributive spending, lower economic growth may complicate the government
process aimed at accommodating competing cla ims on the budget as compared to a more equal
society with lower redistributive spending and high growth.' (p. 56) .
The second group of models investigates the link between income distribution and
macroeconomic outcomes, including fiscal performance. The prominent hypothesis in these
models is that poor and liquidity-constrained households want to run government deficits thereby
hampering and caus ing the deferment of the implementation of fisca l reform programs, such as
fiscal consolidation, even when the economic case is clear and compelling. Larch (2012) points
out that , procrastination is a function of how the cost of reforms is distributed: the more unequal
the distributiori of costs of reform the stronger the resistance to change.
2.2 Empirical literature revi ew
2.2.1 Domestic sha re of public debt as the explana tory va riable
Salti (20 I I) performs an empirical examination on the effect of public debt composition on the
Gini coefficient with a similar hypothesis to that of You & Dutt (1996), that domestic debt
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primarily held by higher income earners, yet serviced by the entire tax base, skews income
distribution regressively. A panel of cross-country data from 109 countries between 1990 and
2007 is used . The study found consistent evidence that 'the domestic share of public debt is
associated with higher levels of the Gini coefficient' (Salti, 20 I I) .
The hypothesis is further refined to examine whether the effect of domestic debt on income
depends on the purpose for which the debt is being raised. The impact of GOP per capita on the
re lationship between domestic debt and income inequality is also looked into. The impact of GOP
per capita on the relationship between the two variables may arise because countries where GOP
per capita is higher will issue domestic debt at lower interest rates while those whose GOP per
capita is lower will issue debt at higher interest rates due to the perceived riskiness in lending to
such countries.
The Gini coefficient is therefore initially regressed against domestic share of public debt and
GOP per capita. In this regression the coefficient of domestic share of public debt has a value of
6.69 i.e. an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of domestic debt in public debt leads to
an increase of 0.669 percentage points in the Gini coefficient and is significant at I% level. The
coefficient of GOP per capita though being significant at only 10% level shows that GOP per
capita does play a protective role but does not undermine the relat ionship between the two
variables . Adding government expenditure to the regression hardly alters the magnitude or
significance of coefficient of domestic share of public debt. However, replacing government
expenditure with the ratio of government expenditure to GNI lowers the magn itude and
significance of the coefficient of domestic share of pub lic debt to 4.54, significant only at 10%.
However, when the ratio of debt service to GNI is added to this list of regressors and replacing
the ratio of government expenditure to GNI with the absolute value of government expenditure,
the coefficient of domestic share of public debt shoots up to 8.18 and is significant at I% level.
Salti (20 II) therefore concludes that the domestic share of public debt is consistently regressive
across the different specifications made and hence the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis.
Furthermore, externa l debt is vouched for as a better alternative to deficit fina nc ing due to its
considerably smaller effect on income inequa lity .
However, one may argue that there is the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity in the Salt i
(20 I I) model due to the exclusion of wealth inequality as an explanatory factor. It is possible that
wealth inequality could be a confounding factor between income inequality and domestic share of
public debt. Wealth inequality is likely to lead to higher levels of income inequality as the wealth
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n owners seek to earn returns on the stocks of wealth the hold. This may be through leasing orlending and/or engaging in enterprise even through the purchase of equity securities. Government
debt securities form a means for wealth owners to earn returns on their wealth. Hence it is very
plausible that the higher the wealth inequality, the higher the domestic share of public debt.
2.2. 2 The Gini coefficien t as the explana tory variable
Larch (2012) empirically tests the possibility of income inequality as a factor causing persistent
fiscal deficits using data on income inequality, national accounts, including fiscal variables, and
data on political and societal institutions. The study is conducted using a data set covering 30
middle income and industrialized countries over the period of 1960 to 2007.
For data on income inequality, the Gini coefficient is used as it offers the broadest coverage
across time and countries. Comparing the Gini coefficient to its closest alternative, the 9th to l "
decile ratio, Larch (2012) notes that the latter captures only a part of the distributional spectrum
while the former represents a synthetic measure of the entire distribution. Also , due to the issue of
quality of data on income inequality, Larch (20 I2) performs his panel regression on five different
sets of data from five data bases. These are UNU-WIDER data-base, the data set constructed by
Oeininger and Squ ire (1996), figures from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) , the OECO and
EUROSTAT.
In the preliminary study, an ANOV A test comparing means between two subsets of the data , that
is, countries with above average Gini coeffic ient and those that have lower than average Gin i
coefficient, is performed. It is found that countries with above average Gini coefficient have
statistically significant higher budget deficits as a percentage of GOP , have more right winged
governments and a significantly higher number of political crises and anti-government
demonstrations. However, the same countries have statistically significant lower social spending
as a percentage of GOP as well as lower government debt as a percentage of GOP . This seems to
be a bit of a contradiction. One would expect the higher budget deficits are driven by higher
social spending and would result in higher debt to GOP ratios.
For the panel regression, the budget balance to GOP ratio is first regressed against itself, against
Gini coefficient and against GOP growth, all lagged by one year. Other variables include number
of anti-government protests and dummy variables for representing the quality of fiscal rules,
legislative election and political orientation of governments amongst others. The lagged value of
budget deficit is meant to capture the degree of inertia in budget balancing. The real GOP growth
is set as an indicator of business and economic cycles since these cycles may be confounding
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factors affecting both deficits and income inequality. The findings are that the coefficient for
GOP growth is statistically significant and positive across all the data sets used , however, the
coefficient for Gini coefficient is statistically insignificant, though negative,in all but one data set.
This implies a weak negative relationship between fiscal performance and income inequality.
In the second regression, interacting terms are introduced to the equation: These interacting terms
are, Gini coefficient * Real GOP growth, Gini coefficient * political orientation of the
government and Gini coefficient * number of anti-government protests. The coefficient for the
interaction term between right wing government and Gini coefficient has a negative algebraic
work and turns out to be statistically significant across many data sets. This shows, first , that the
preference for fiscal discipline among right wing governments weakens as inequality of income
rises. Secondly, it coincides with the hypothesis that income inequality would give rise to
political pressure favouring deficits. The coefficient for the interaction term between number of
anti-government protests and Gini coefficientseems to lead to higher deficits or lower surpluses
most likely on the back of governments' attempts to calm the situation by handing out money to
the less well-off.
The coefficient of the third interaction term , real GOP growth and Gini coefficient, is negative
and in most cases statistically significant. Therefore, inequality tends to dampen the impact of
economic growth on the balance sheet. Essentially, this means that the high the Gini coefficient,
the lower the benefit on fiscal performance from economic growth. In fact Larch (2012) says, 'for
very high Gini coefficient, the budgetary impact of economic growth could actually be negative.'
The estimated value of these very high Gini coefficients is about 45 to 50.
Larch (2012) concludes that the link between income distribution and fiscal balance is not a direct
one. Rather, income distribution is likely to make its impact on fiscal performance through 'more
circuitous ways' , that is, in combination with other variables. And , in this case, these are real
GOP growth, government political orientation and political instability. However, this empirical
analysis is done using a sample of countries all in the same economic block, the OEeO, and
roughly within the same economic/development status. Additionally, the study does not test the













This section has examined the soundness of the idea that high levels of debt could be potentially
detrimental to an economy. Though no conclusion or consensus on the matter has been
highlighted explicitly, cause for the prudent management of debt is shown. Literature on the
relationship between national debt and income inequality has also been reviewed. Invest igating
the hypothesis that domestic debt leads to higher levels of income inequality, You and Dutt
(1996) find that the impact of public debt on income distribution depends on the purpose why
raised. Larch (2012) hypothesises distributional conflicts due to income inequality are likely to
lead to sustained fiscal deficits. He finds that income inequality is likely to affect fiscal
performance through government political orientation, political stability and by hampering fiscal
performance during economic booms. Finally, Salti (2011) finds evidence that domestic debt
regressively skews income distribution.
However, none of the studies reviewed studies or tests the impact of income inequality on
national debt. Salti (20 II) also fails to incorporate wealth inequality in her model investigating
the impact of domestic debt on income distribution. This study therefore pushes forward the
analysis of the link between income distribution and fiscal performance by test ing the impact of
both income inequality and national debt on each other. In testing the effect of domestic debt on











The nature of this study is explanatory as it seeks to ana lyse the reasons for the rising levels of
national debt and income inequality, across various economies, proposing either variable as the
cause of the othe r. Given the numerical nat ure of the indicators and measures of the two var iables
investigated, the study emp loys the use of quantitative methods to test for causation between the
two var iables . Moreover, since the findi ngs of the study should be app licab le to any economy on
the globe, and given that the analysis considers the evo lution of the variables of interest, both
cross-sectional and longitudinal designs are taken up for the stud y.
3.2 Data collection
Three types of data will be collected for each sample country over the period of concern. They
include data on income inequality, data on nation al accounts including fiscal variables and data
on major economic variables such as economic growth and inflation rates. These shall all be
collected from secondary sources which include: UNU -WIDER database on income inequality
measures, the OEeD database on a wide variety of data , the Wor ld Bank's World Economic
Indicators ' database and the database for comp osition of pub lic debt for 130 countries compiled
by Pazinna (2008). These data sources will also be supplemented by the Development Finance
dataset of the World Bank and the Quarterly External Debt Database of the IMF and the World
Bank . These databases are readily avail able on the internet for those with browsing mac hines and
access to data storage devices .
3.3 Population and sample
The popul ation of this sample is all the countries of the world . However, the sample frame
consists of countries .for which the relevant data is avail able . The target. sample size is thirty to
forty countries as this number yields a tolerable margin of error and a good level of confidence.
The sampling technique used is similar to the stratified random sampling technique. This is
because the sample should be a good representative of the different regions and income status,
high/middle/low-income status, that countries fall in. Additionally, the study uses a period of
thirty years, from 1980 to 20 IO. The period is chosen as it is adequate to yie ld a high level of
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confidence for the est imation of parameters and maxim izes the degrees of freedom for the panel
regression subject to data availability.
3.4 Data analysis
Data is analysed by use of panel regression techniques . Two regression equations are run as
follows:
(1)
Gini, = po+ Pllola,-debl ti-t + P2Gil1 i;r.1+ Lj ajXij.t-l + Lk YktotaCdebtit_1Xik.t_l
+~ m
Where,
total debt is the ratio of total national debt to GOP.
Gini is the income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient of market incomes.
Xj represents other variables of interest such as real GOP growth rate , ratio of government
expenditure to GOP, ratio of gross savings to GOP, amongst others.
i represents the country, i = 1, 2, .... 11; and I is for time .
Ideally, three regression equations should be run . This would allow for the decomposition of debt
into domestic debt and external debt. The two variables relative to GOP, would then be treated as
separate variables and the effect of income inequality on both would be tested. Equally, the
separate effect of domestic debt and external debt on income inequality would be analysed.
However, it is quite challenging to get the decomposition of debt into domestic and extemaI debt,
especially for developed nations. As such, total national debt to GOP ratio is used , with the
analysis involving the two equations above.
The lagged value of total national debt is added to the regression equation (I) so as to capture the
sensitivity of CUITent debt levels to previous debt levels. Real GOP growth rate is put in so as to
. capture business cycles; recessions and in particular the effect of the global financial crisis
(Larch, 2012). Business cycles and economic recessions would probably be correlated to both
national debt and income inequality. Government expenditure (Salti , 2011) relative to GOP size
is also a potential confounding factors that could lead to unobserved endogeneity in the model.
Higher government expenditure is associated with higher employment rates , and in the long -run ,








hence lower inequality. Other variables that are included as control variables are political stability
and military expenditure.
In equation (2) , the control variables included are government expenditure, Consumer Price Index
(CPI) and gross savings as a percentage of GOP. Government expenditure is correlated to both
our variables of interest. Inflation is theorised to affect income distribution since the adjustment
of wages due to inflation is not even for all persons . Additionally, CPI may be correlated also to
total national debt levels . Govemments may use high inflation to depress real interest rates thus
making it cheaper to borrow and lead to higher levels of debt.
It is very possible that wealth inequality may be strongly correlated with both income inequality
and total national debt. The stock of wealth one has is used to generate income. Treasury
securities forms a part of this individuals ' wealth . Therefore high wealth in an economy could
mean higher income inequality but potentially also higher levels of domestic debt , due to a higher
demand for treasury securities by the wealthy. Given that there is hardly any data on wealth
inequality, gross savings is introduced to serve as a proxy for wealth inequality. This is because
savings may be viewed as the annual increment in one's stock of wealth. However, gross savings
has some short comings. First , this variable includes public sector savings. Assets and any
savings of the public sector ideally are national/publ ic assets and do not belong to any individual.
Secondly, gross savings does not show the heterogeneity in the level of savings amongst the
different households, firms and other entities. As such , the unequal distribution of these savings is
not brought out.
Both equations include interaction variables in their list of regressors. They allow for the
investigation of other ways in which either of the two main variables may affect the other. In
equation one an interaction variable between a dummy variable and Gini is also included. The
dummy variables allow for the analysis of the role of the geographical location and development
status in determining the relationship between the two variables. All the explanatory variables are
lagged so as to better factor the time responsiveness of the explained variable.
Diagnostic tests such as unit root tests and cointegration tests are carried out after which panel
regression analysis is done. The Hausman test is used determine which between the fixed effects
model and the random effects model is more appropriate for each regression run Furthermore, to













The results highlighted in this section are categorized into two . Table I shows the results of the
equations with total national debt as the dependent variable. Table 2 shows the results of the
equations with Gini as the independent variable
4.1 Effec t of income inequality on the accumulat ion of national debt
Regressing total debt against itself and Gini , both lagged by one period, yields a positive slope
coefficient for Gini, but which is not statistically significant. With the addition of government
expenditure as a proportion of GOP and the real GOP growth, the slope coefficient becomes
larger in magnitude and significant at 10% significance level. In this case, the results indicate an
increase in Gini by I, leads to a subsequent increase in the ratio of national debt to GOP by
0.3 I%. The slope coefficient of real GOP growth is negative and very significant, rem aining as
such in all subsequent equations with adjusted specifications. This is in line with the findings of
Larch (2012) where the lower the growth in real GOP, the higher the budget deficit. The
coefficient of government expenditure is positive and significant, showing that an increase in
government expenditure relative to the economy is likely to put greater pressure for deficit
spending. This result is expected, assuming government revenues remain unchanged.
Replacing gov ernment expenditure with health expenditure as a proxy for social/welfare
expenditure yields a Gini slope coefficient that's significant at I% level. The slope coefficient of
health expenditure is positive and significant at 10% significance level. However, upon the
introduction of military expenditure, the coefficient of health expenditure becomes negative and
statistically insignificant. The coefficient of military exp enditure is also negative and
insignificantly different from zero. The coefficient of Gini remains statistically significant at 1%
significance level.
Pol itical stability as measured by the World Bank index for pol itical stability and absence of.
violence/terrorism is also introduced. The index 's spectrum of values runs from -2.5 (highly
politically unstable countries with high internal conflict) to 2.5 (h ighly politically stable countries
with no levels of violence). The slope coefficient of Gini becomes significant at 5% level. The
coefficient of political stability index is negative and significant at 10% significance level. Th is
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Panel regression - Dependent va r ia ble: Total national debt
Unbalanced panel. OLS est imation with country fixed affects.
~ ~I - 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ --::::J ::-l ~
Tab/e /
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
c 3.507 24.487 17.592 17.352 -49.654 -7.393 -41.289 16.409 13.620 6.393 7.136
(0.558) (0.003) (0.035) (0. /42) (0.000) (0.5 /3) (0.017) (0.057) (0.393) (0.297) (0.245)
total debt 0.857 0.833 0.8 14
(- 1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gini(- I) 0.\55 0.279 0.309
(0.339) (0.095) (0.064)
govt_expenditure 1.438 1.167























































































0.9270 0.8819 0.9264 0.8734 0.8738
284 612 357 625 625
Note: Figures in brackets are p-values. The appendage of (-I) on the dependent variable names shows the variable enters the equation, lagged by one period.
Dependent variables: TOTAL_DEBT - Total national debt as a percentage of GDP; GINI - Gini coefficients; GOVT_EXPENDITURE - government
expenditure as a percentage of GDP; REAL_GDP_GROWn-I - real GDP growth; HEALTH_EXPEND - health expenditure as a percentage of GDP;
MILITARY_EXPEND - military expenditure as a percentage of GDP; POLITICAL_STABILITY - political stability and absence of violence/terrorism index;
R.GDP.GROWTH_GINI - Interaction variable between the ,.ea/~dg~rowth and g ini; GINI.HEALTH - Interaction variable between gini and health expend;
GINI.DUMDEV - Interaction variable between gini and the dummy variable for development status of a country; GINI.DUMEUR - interaction variable between






resonates with the findings of Larch (2012) who used the number of anti-government protests as
the measure for political stability. His results show that the lower the political stability, the lower
the budget balance. Putting all the variables together doesn 't lead to much changes in the values
and significance of the coefficients. The coefficient for Gini remains significant at 1%
. significance level.
When the interaction variables between Gini and the real GOP growth, and between Gini and
govemment expenditure are introduced separately, the significance of the Gini falls below the
10% significance level. The coefficients of the interactive variables are themselves also not
significant. This to a large extent goes contrary to the findings of Larch (2012), who finds that
even though the direct impact of distribution of income on the budget balance may be weak and
statistically insignificant, there is evidence that income distribution can have an impact through
more circuitous ways, in combination with other variables such as the real GOP growth and the
political orientation of the current government, which greatly influences the level of government
expenditure and fiscal d iscipline.
Another set of interaction variables are added separately. These are the interaction between Gini
and the dummy for development status of a country , and between Gini . and the dummy for
whether a country is in Europe or not. The dummy variable for the development status of a
country is constructed on the basis of the country classification into developed and developing
nations, by the UN (United Nations, 2014). If the country is listed as developed, the dummy takes
on a value of I, and 0 if not. For the other dummy variable, it takes on the value of I if the
country is in Europe and 0 if not. In a surprising twist of events, the , the regressions yield
negative and significant slope coefficients for each variable. In fact , the magnitude of these
coefficients is larger than those of the Gini variable. This means that the overall effect of income
inequality on total national debt relative to GOP is inverse for developed countries and countries
in Europe.
Larch (2012) who uses a sample of 30 GEeD countries, many of which are developed and in
Europe finds , though statistically insignificant, negative .coefficients for the Gini . .Meaning that
the lower the income inequality, the higher the budget balance (the higher the budget surplus/the
small the budget deficit). What then can be the explanation for these results? Given that the Gini
coefficient used is based on disposable income, it is possible that in the long-run, the deficit
spending by government in order to remedy for income inequality does lead to lower levels of










forms of government expenditure lead to increased social mobility, introduction/increase in
unemployment benefits, increased employment and an increase in the overall level of economic
activity, thereby increasing disposable incomes, especially for people in the lower income
bracket. Hence, ignoring the correlation of Gini and national debt across time , cross-sectional
comparison of countries' debt and Gini , for those countries in Europe and in the developed world,
may lead to the conclusion that the lower a country's Gini coefficients, the higher its debt , as a
result of proactively aiding in redistribution of income through increased government
expenditure.
4 .2 Effec t of national debt on income inequality
In the regression of Gini against itself and total debt , both lagged by one period, the coefficient of
total national debt is positive, though small in magnitude, and significant. For an increase in the
ratio of national debt to GOP of 1%, Gini is likely to increase by 0.009. Salti (20 I0) found that
the coefficient of total national debt as a percentage of GOP when regressed again st inequality,
and the share of domestic debt in the total debt is included, is statistically insignificant.
The introduction of government expenditure in the regression equation does not alter the
significance of the coefficient of total debt. Its own coefficient is negative and statistically
insignificant. Salti (20 I0) found that government expenditure has a negative significant impact on
income inequality. Introducing an interaction variable between total debt and government
expenditure changes things quite a bit. The coefficient of national debt now becomes negative
and statistically insignificant. The coefficient of government expenditure is still negative and
insignificant while that of the interacting variable is positive and significant at 10% significance
level. The coefficient shows that the effect of total debt on Gini increases as Government
expenditure increases. This doesn't make sense, given that if the government takes up more debt
to increase its expenditure further, rather than , say, to make interest payments, the effect of
national debt on income inequality should be smaller. However, Salti (20 I0) in a similar way
interacts the share of domestic debt in national debt and government expenditure and finds a
positive but insignificant coefficient of this variable.
The addition of gross savings as a percentage and GOP and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) have
no impact on the significance of the coefficient of total debt. The coefficient is positive and
significant at I% significance level. The coefficients of both gross savings and CPI are both








wealth inequality, have no significant impact on the distribution of incomes. Similarly, the level
of inflation seems not to have a redistributive effect on incomes.
Table 2
Panel regression - Dependent variable: Gini
Unbalanced panel. OLS estimation with country fixed affects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
c 7.513 8.149 14.989 7.235 9.130 8.825
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
gini(-I) 0.778 0.766 0.562 0.791 0.730 0.742
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
total_debt(-I) 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.009









R_squared 0.9775 0.9777 0.9792 0.9792 0.9786 0.9804
No . observation 491 482 286 480 470 460
Note: Figures in brackets are p-values. The appendage of (- I) on the dependent variable names
shows the variable enters the equation, lagged by one period.
Variables: TOTAL_DEBT - Total national debt as a percentage of GDP ; GINI - Gini
coefficients; GOVT_EXPENDITURE - government expenditure as a percentage of GDP;
HEALTH_EXPEND - health expenditure as a percentage of GDP ; GROSS_SAVINGS - Gross
Savings as a percentage ofGDP; CPI- Consumer Price Index.
Testing for Granger causality between the two main variables, total national debt and Gini, none
is found to Granger cause the other. There is no significant increase in the explanatory power in





The findings of th is study show evidence of a direct link between Income ineq uality and the
levels of debt in an economy. The results consistently show that the degree of income inequality
has a positive effect on debt. Though the significance of this effect does not meet the threshold in
all the regression specifications, it may still be concluded that the more uneven the distribution of
incomes in an economy, the greater the likelihood of an increase in the debt accumulated in that
economy. Furthermore, the impact of income inequality on debt is independent of the impact of
economic/business cycles, previous levels of government expenditure and political stability.
With the exception of the results found for developed and European countries, the findings
support the three propositions made at the beginning of this paper. The more unequally
distributed incomes are , the higher the demand for redistributive spending and the more difficult
it is to balance the budget. Secondly, the more unequal society is, the greater the delays in making
the fiscal adjustments necessary in correcting the dismal and unsustainable fiscal situation. And
thirdly, the more unequal society is, the higher the proportion of the cost of fiscal consolidation to
be borne by the less well off, hence the greater the resistance to what would amount to austerity
measures by the government. In other words, income inequality gives rise to political and social
pressure for excessive government spending or excessive government subsidies.
In the case of European and developed nations, the results are to be contrary to the seemingly
observed correlation between income inequality and levels of debt , given , further, that both
variables are at their highest levels in the last thirty years. The most plausible source of this
inverse relationship wou ld be in the cross-sectional trend. Countries with lower Gin i have higher
levels of debt , while those with higher Gini , have lower levels of debt. This may suggest that
excessive government spending financed by debt does remedy for income inequality. However,
the second set of results in the study bring to question such a suggestion. The results show that
total national debt , relative to GOP , has a positive impact on income inequality. This, therefore,
confirms the proposition that the interest payments from govemment securities to the holders of
those securities, significantly regresses the distribution of income in an economy.
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5.2 Limitations
Due to the unavailability of data on debt decomposition into domestic and extemal debt, this
paper is unable to analyse the separate effects of domestic debt and extemal debt on income
inequality. The suggestions of You and Dutt (1997) and the findings of Salti (20 10) are therefore
not tested effectively.
The consistency of the methodology applied in calculating the Gini coefficient for the sampled
countries is also another major limitation. In fact Larch (2012) notes that there is no commonly
agreed methodological basis for the construction of (income) distribution data . This makes the
comparison of income inequality across time and countries difficult due to methodological
breaks, difference in coverage, units of reference and/or income concept. More than this, a more
preferable measure for income inequality for this study would have been the Gini coefficient
based on market incomes. In this study, Gini based on disposable income, was used . This
measure of Gini bears some effect of the redistributive effect of fiscal policy on incomes. This is
because disposable income is net of tax and would include benefits received by citizens from the
govemment. This is therefore a major short coming of this study.
5.3 Policy recommendations
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study, it is clear that one of the means to effectively
tackle the problem of rising debt levels in many economies around the world is to tackle the
question of rising income inequality. Policies to combat income inequality that do not involve
excessive government spending and excessive government subsidies should be sought. This is not
to say that fiscal policy should abandon its ' redistribution of incomes ' role , but instead should
effect this role prudently, bearing in mind the cost of excessive national debt on the economy as
well as its counter-productive effect on income inequality. Furthermore, governments should
channel redistributive spending towards sectors that would increase social mobility and give all
access to equal opportunities. This in the long-run could be effective in taming income inequality.
5.4 Areas of further research
Though the findings of this study lead to the conclusion that higher levels of income inequality
lead to higher levels of debt in a country, not all the results point in this direction. The case of








Granger causality tests seem to weaken the strength of the conclusion of this study. Therefore
further research is needed in this area so that more conclusive results/findings can be achieved.
This study also fails to concretely and conclusively identify the channels through which income
inequality impacts national debt. The main channel proposed here is that of excessive government
expenditure. Other channels should be investigated, such as that 'of excessive government
subsidies to cushion those in the lower end of the distribution tail. Yet another channel that could
be researched on, is whether income inequality has an effect on the cost of borrowing to the
government. Is it possible that higher income inequality, increase aggregate savings thus making
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Appendix A: Sa mpled Count r ies
Thesamp led countries , their development status and the geographica l location are given below,
Development Ceogra hica l Development G eograh ical
Country st a tus re z ion C ountry sta t us r egion
I Arge ntina Developing South America 18 Ke nya Developi ng Eastern Afr ica
2 A us tra lia Develo ped Australia 19 Malawi Develop ing So uthern Africa
3 Brazil Deve lop ing South America 20 Mexico Deve loping North America
4 Bulgaria Developed Eas tern Europe 21 Ne the rla nds Deve loped Western Europe
5 Ca nada Developed North Amer ica 22 Nigeria Develop ing West Africa
6 Chi le Develop ing So uth America 23 Norway Developed Northern Europe
7 China Develop ing East As ia 24 Pa raguay Developing So uth America
8 Egy pt Develop ing North Africa 25 Poland Developed Central Euro pe
Economy in
9 Finland Developed Northern Europe 26 Russia tran sit ion Eastern Europe
10 France Developed Weste rn Europe 27 Singapore Deve loping South East Asia
I I Germa ny Developed Western Europe 28 South Africa Developing So uthern Africa
12 Ghana Develop ing West Africa 29 Spai n Developed Western Europe
13 G reece Developed Eastern Europe 30 Sweden Developed Northern Europe
14 India Developi ng Asia 31 Tha ilan d Developing So uth East Asia
15 Israel Developing Midd le East 32 T urkey Developing Eastern Europe
16 Italy Developed We stern Europe 33 UK Developed Wes tern Europe
17 Japan Developed East Asia 34 US Deve loped North America
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[I Appendix B: Grange r -Sims test applied
The Granger-Sims technique applied involves running four equations, two unrestricted and two
restricted, with the purpose of testing whether eithe r of the variables Granger Cause each other.
Testing that Gini Granger Causes Total Debt
(I)
(2)
Testing that Total Debt Granger causes Gini
(3)
(4)
The R~ ' s for each regression are given below together with the F-stati stics and critical values for
each test.
Testing that Gini Granger Testing that total debt Granger
causes total debt causes Gini
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
r-squared 0.8910 0.8993 0.9770 0.9813
No. of
observations 820 388 354 315
F-statistic - 0.2673
10% level 1.88 1.88
5% level 2.26 2.26
1% level 3.11 3.11
In testing whether Gini Granger causes total debt , it is not possible to compute the F-stati stic
becau se the R~ of the unrestricted model is small er than the R~ of the restricted model. This is due
to the differences in number of observations in each equation, arising from more data gaps
present in the Gini data .
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